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Abstract
To investigate how people anticipate and attempt to shape others’ self-regulatory eﬀorts, this work examined the impact of
abstract and concrete mindsets on attention to goal-relevant aspects of others’ situations. An abstract (relative to a concrete)
mindset, by making accessible the cognitive operation of considering activities’ purpose (versus process) was predicted to focus
attention on how others’ self-evaluative situations could impact others’ long-term aims of self-knowledge and self-improvement,
thus facilitating the anticipation and preference that others pursue accurate, even self-critical, feedback. Participants in an abstract
(relative to a concrete) mindset both anticipated (Experiment 1) and suggested (Experiments 2a and b) that others pursue realistic
rather than overly positive self-relevant information, with the latter eﬀect apparently explained by the salience of abstract versus
concrete goal-relevant features of others’ situations (Experiment 2b). Implications for self-regulatory mindsets, as well as for in-
terpersonal relations, are discussed.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Knowing a person’s goals facilitates understanding
and predicting the person’s behaviors. Accordingly, not
only researchers of personality (e.g., Adler, 1927; Can-
tor, 1994; Emmons, 1989; Grant & Dweck, 1999; Mi-
schel, 1973) but also ordinary observers seek the goals
underlying others’ behaviors and rely on goal-related
assumptions to predict others’ future behaviors (e.g.,
Bassili, 1989; Read & Miller, 1993). Moreover, as work
supervisors, teachers, siblings, caring friends, and par-
ents can attest, people often must guide others toward
appropriate goals in given situations. How do people
meet the related challenges of anticipating and guiding
others’ self-regulatory eﬀorts?
Answering both questions appears to depend sub-
stantially on how people view others’ situations. Situa-
tional inducements, potential rewards versus penalties
for performing particular acts, help people identify the
goals and aims likely underlying others’ behaviors
(Chun, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2002; Trope, 1986; Trope
& Alﬁeri, 1997).
1 Even without observing others’ be-
haviors, moreover, people use situational cues to de-
termine the goals others’ situations aﬀord attaining
(Gibson, 1979/1986; Proﬃtt, Stefanucci, Banton, &
Epstein, 2003; Rochat, 1995; Stroﬀregen, Gorday,
Sheng, & Flynn, 1999). Thus, people expect others to
pursue diﬀerent goals in diﬀerent situations, such as job
interviews, fraternity parties, and ﬁrst dates (Cantor,
Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982). In much the same vein,
people guide others toward goals sensitive to situational
qWe thank Ana D  ıaz, Michelle Gomez, Jessica Velasquez, and
Rosemary Ventura for invaluable assistance in the coding of free
responses. Parts of this work were completed while pre-doctoral
fellowships from the Ford Foundation and the Jacob K. Javits
program supported the ﬁrst author.
*Corresponding author.
E-mail address: antonio.freitas@sunysb.edu (A.L. Freitas).
1 How such identiﬁcations of actors’ aims in a situation inﬂuence
inferences of the actor’s underlying, stable dispositions, an issue central
to much person-perception research (e.g., Gilbert, 1998; Trope &
Gaunt, 1999), lies beyond the immediate scope of this investigation,
although we touch brieﬂy upon the issue in the General discussion,
under the heading, ‘‘Interpersonal implications.’’
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Moretti & Higgins, 1999b). Parents’ inﬂuences on their
children’s academic performance, for example, are
contextualized, with some inspiring stronger eﬀorts in
creative situations and others inspiring stronger eﬀorts
in analytic situations (Shah, 2003). Situational cues thus
appear central to anticipating and guiding others’ self-
regulatory eﬀorts.
Any situation, however, likely contains multiple
goal-relevant cues, each of which can be construed in
myriad ways (cf. Brown, 1958). What determines the
impact of one’s particular construal of another’s situ-
ation on one’s inferences concerning the other’s self-
regulatory eﬀorts? Arguably the most fundamental
task of self-regulation is balancing abstract, long-term
aims with immediate, concrete experiences, as when a
child delays enjoying a cookie to receive two later, a
smoker eschews a cigarette in the service of better
health, or a student endures a rigorous study session
on the road to a better grade (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, &
Rodriguez, 1989; Rachlin, 2000; Trope & Fishbach,
2000). Accordingly, construing others’ situations in
terms of the abstract aims versus immediate experi-
ences they aﬀord attaining, by highlighting quite dis-
tinct situational inducements, should inﬂuence
particularly potently one’s anticipation and guidance
of others’ self-regulatory eﬀorts. Focusing on the low-
level, concrete experiences aﬀorded by another’s situ-
ation should lead one to both expect and prefer that
the other pursue the most comfortable and feasible
means of action, given that rewards and punishments
associated with the process of the activity would be
most salient. Focusing on the high-level, abstract aims
aﬀorded by another’s situation, in contrast, should
lead one to both expect and prefer that the other
pursue the action providing the greatest long-term
beneﬁts, given that rewards and punishments associ-
ated with the ultimate aim of the activity would be
most salient (cf., Liberman & Trope, 1998; Vallacher
& Kaufman, 1996). Previously unexplored determi-
nants of such construals, we suggest, are abstract and
concrete mindsets.
Abstract and concrete mindsets
Any action can be construed at varying levels of
abstraction, from low levels, specifying how it is per-
formed, to high levels, specifying why it is performed
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987). High-level, why,
construals represent the action’s purpose and thus are
of primary concern when contemplating an action.
Low-level, how, construals represent the action’s pro-
cess and thus are of secondary concern when contem-
plating an action (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Locking a
door, for example, could be construed as ‘‘turning a
key,’’ a relatively low-level identiﬁcation of the process
of how one locks a door, or as ‘‘securing one’s home,’’
a relatively high-level identiﬁcation of the purpose of
why one locks a door (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989).
Focusing directly on a situation’s low-level or high-le-
vel contents, as when an interaction partner focuses on
(low-level) speech utterances or (high-level) interaction
aims, directly inﬂuences one’s construal of the situation
(e.g., Vallacher, Wegner, McMahan, Cotter, & Larsen,
1992).
Independent of information speciﬁc to a particular
situation, however, the accessibility of cognitive opera-
tions can inﬂuence more generally how new information
is processed in new situations. As ﬁrst demonstrated
early last century, encountering tasks requiring the use
of a particular cognitive operation, such as inverting
letters in a particular way to solve anagrams, increases
the operation’s likelihood of usage on upcoming tasks
(e.g., Ach, 1910; K€ ulpe, 1904; Rees & Israel, 1935).
Examining the role that these diﬀering accessibilities of
cognitive operations, contemporarily termed mindsets,
play in self-regulation, recent work has exploited
Heckhausen’s (1986) parsing of self-regulation into four
distinct phases: (a) deliberating whether to take action,
(b) planning action implementation, (c) taking action,
and (d) evaluating action. Focusing on the ﬁrst two, pre-
actional phases, this work posits that each phase re-
quires its own distinct cognitive operations, which, once
accessible due to recent usage, color how people inter-
pret newly encountered information (Gollwitzer, 1990;
Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999). In one study, for instance,
participants either were held in a pre-decisional, delib-
erative state or were pushed to make a decision and to
plan implementation (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Ra-
tajczak, 1990). On a test of their memory concerning a
subsequent, unrelated task, participants in the deliber-
ative condition recalled greater amounts of deliberative
information, whereas participants in the implementa-
tional condition recalled greater amounts of implemen-
tation-related information. Such ﬁndings show that
making accessible distinct cognitive operations can ori-
ent one towards congruent information, across diﬀerent
content domains.
These considerations imply that thinking about the
abstract aims (versus concrete procedures) related to
one activity or situation could increase the accessibility
of the general cognitive operation of considering ac-
tivities’ purpose (versus process), thus coloring one’s
construal of a newly encountered activity or situation.
Given the assumption that balancing long-term, ab-
stract aims and immediate, concrete experiences con-
stitutes the core essence of self-regulation (e.g., Mischel
et al., 1989; Rachlin, 2000; Trope & Fishbach, 2000),
this hypothesized applicability of an abstract or con-
crete mindset across diﬀerent content domains holds
particular relevance for anticipating and guiding the
self-regulatory eﬀorts of others, who, because they are
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identical to one’s own. Might considering why rather
than how to improve one’s own health, for example,
inﬂuence whether one construes another person’s non-
health-related situation in terms of its impact on
abstract, long-term aims rather than on immediate,
concrete experiences?
Pursuing these questions requires an approach dif-
ferent from earlier work on deliberative and imple-
mentational mindsets (Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer &
Bayer, 1999). Consistent with the current aims,
adopting a deliberative mindset, that is, considering
potential pros versus cons of particular courses of ac-
tion, should highlight the abstract, high-level value of
activities, and adopting an implementational mindset,
that is, planning how to carry out activities, should
highlight the concrete, low-level procedures that com-
prise activities. However, reﬂecting the conceptual at-
tribution of deliberative and implementational
mindsets to naturally occurring action phases (Heck-
hausen & Gollwitzer, 1987), a deliberative mindset
additionally entails being undecided about an issue,
and an implementational mindset additionally entails
being decided about an issue (Gollwitzer, 1990). Inde-
pendent of any eﬀects of abstract versus concrete
construals reﬂecting the accessibility of cognitive op-
erations, then, decisional status alone could impact
motivation-related variables. Once decided upon an
issue, that is, people favor information supporting their
decision over information challenging it (e.g., Brehm &
Cohen, 1962; Kunda, 1990; Zakay & Tsal, 1993). Im-
portantly, moreover, such motivational eﬀects can
carry over to newly encountered situations. Accord-
ingly, Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) showed that par-
ticipants in an implementational mindset (who had
planned the implementation of a previously decided-
upon course of action) viewed objective risk factors
more favorably (i.e., as less likely to impact them) than
did participants in a deliberative mindset (who had
deliberated whether or not to undertake a previously
undecided course of action). Gollwitzer and Kinney
(1989) suggest that such eﬀects indicate that imple-
mentational mindset manipulations generate broad
determination to complete whatever task may be at
hand, thus fostering the illusion that situational aﬀor-
dances are overly supportive of whatever goals one
may hold. Further supporting a motivational inter-
pretation, implementational mindset manipulations in-
crease cognitive dissonance eﬀects, fostering greater
devaluation of non-chosen alternatives and greater
valuation of chosen alternatives (Harmon-Jones &
Harmon-Jones, 2002). Extant mindsets eﬀects, then,
appear to depend not only cognitive operations made
accessible through thinking abstractly versus concretely
but also on motivation generated through commitment
to decisions.
Current research
In the experiments described herein, we instilled
general abstract and concrete mindsets independently of
participants’ decisional statuses. We next assessed par-
ticipants’ anticipations (Experiments 1 and 2) and pre-
ferred guidance (Experiment 2) of others’ self-regulatory
eﬀorts. The self-regulatory domain upon which we fo-
cused was self-evaluation. The process of evaluating
oneself can be considered a self-regulatory tradeoﬀ be-
tween seeking immediate, concrete beneﬁts, through
acquiring positive, pleasant-to-receive feedback, and
seeking longer-term, more abstract beneﬁts, through
acquiring accurate feedback that may be unpleasant to
receive but quite useful for attempts at self-improvement
(Freitas, Salovey, & Liberman, 2001; Mischel, Ebbesen,
& Zeiss, 1973; Trope & Neter, 1994). We tested whether
one’s general mindset could inﬂuence the relative sa-
lience of these concrete versus abstract situational in-
ducements present in others’ situations. If an abstract
mindset highlights the high-level, abstract aims aﬀorded
by another’s self-evaluative situation, then undergoing
an abstract mindset manipulation should lead one to
both expect and suggest that the other pursue accurate,
realistic information, because such information would
provide the greatest abstract, long-term beneﬁts. If a
concrete mindset, in contrast, highlights the low-level,
concrete experiences aﬀorded by another’s situation,
then undergoing a concrete mindset manipulation
should lead one to both expect and suggest that the
other pursue positive feedback, because such informa-
tion would provide the greatest immediate, concrete
beneﬁts.
Experiment 1
Participants assigned to an abstract mindset condi-
tion were directed to consider why they would engage
in an activity (health improvement), whereas partici-
pants assigned to a concrete mindset condition were
directed to consider how they would engage in the same
activity. As illustrated in Fig. 1, structuring these
thought exercises were diagrams requiring participants
to think either: (a) increasingly abstractly about the
activity, by successively indicating why they would
engage in it as well as the higher-level goals served by it
or (b) increasingly concretely about the activity, by
successively indicating how they would engage in it as
well as the lower-level activities comprising it. Ac-
cordingly, by focusing all participants on the same
activity, this manipulation holds constant decisional
status, as well as content domain, while varying only
abstraction level.
We tested the impact of this mindset manipulation
on participants’ inferences regarding others’ eﬀorts in
A.L. Freitas et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40 (2004) 739–752 741a diﬀerent self-regulatory domain, self-evaluation. Self-
relevant information can focus on personal strengths
or weaknesses. Whereas both types of feedback can
help people plan appropriate eﬀort expenditure,
weaknesses-based feedback, although less pleasant to
receive, can help people identify skills they need to
improve (e.g., Dweck, 1998; Dweck & Leggett, 1988;
Freitas et al., 2001; Trope & Neter, 1994; see also
Carver & Scheier, 1999). If an abstract mindset fo-
cuses one’s attention on how others’ self-evaluative
situations can help realize the abstract objectives of
self-knowledge and self-improvement, whereas a con-
crete mindset focuses one’s attention on how others’
self-evaluative situations can impact immediate com-
fort during the self-evaluative process itself, then
participants in an abstract (rather than concrete)
mindset should be more likely: (a) to expect others to
be willing to receive weaknesses-focused (rather than
strengths-focused) feedback and (b) to endorse others’
receipt of weaknesses-focused (rather than strengths-
focused) feedback.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty undergraduates participated in
exchange for credit toward an introductory psychology
course.
Procedure
Based on random assignment, participants com-
pleted either the abstract or concrete versions of the
mindset manipulation described below. All partici-
pants next learned of and answered questions about a
high school social-intelligence assessment, described
below.
Fig. 1. Diagram directing participants to think increasingly abstractly (left panel) or increasingly concretely (right panel) about action, which served
as a component of general abstract versus concrete mindset inductions (see text for fuller explanation).
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Participants were assigned randomly to plan how
they could implement an activity or to consider why
they would engage in the activity. Participants in the
abstract condition considered why they would improve
and maintain their health. As an introduction to this
exercise, these participants read a passage describing
why a person might want to complete a mundane action,
participating in a psychology experiment. This passage
appears below.
For every thing we do, there always is a reason why we do it.
Moreover, we often can trace the causes of our behavior back
to broad life-goals that we have. For example, you currently
are participating in a psychology experiment. Why are you do-
ing this? Perhaps to satisfy a course requirement. Why are you
satisfying the course requirement? Perhaps to pass a psychology
course. Why pass the course? Perhaps because you want to earn
a college degree. Why earn a college degree? Maybe because
you want to ﬁnd a good job, or because you want to educate
yourself. And perhaps you wish to educate yourself or ﬁnd a
good job because you feel that doing so can bring you happi-
ness in life. Research suggests that engaging in thought exercises
like that above, in which one thinks about how one’s actions re-
late to one’s ultimate life goals, can improve people’s life satis-
faction. In this experiment, we are testing such a technique. This
thought exercise is intended to focus your attention on why you
do the things you do. For this thought exercise, please consider
the following activity: ‘improving and maintaining one’s physi-
cal health.’
After reading the passage, participants assigned to
the abstract condition listed three ways in which im-
proving and maintaining their physical health could help
them meet important life goals. In reference to each goal
they listed, participants used a 5-point scale (1¼a little;
5¼very, very much) to answer the question, ‘‘How
much will improving and maintaining your health help
you meet this important goal?’’ Participants in the ab-
stract condition lastly completed a diagram (see Fig. 1,
left panel) showing how improving and maintaining
their health could help them meet their important life
goals.
Participants assigned to the concrete mindset condi-
tion read a passage containing factual information
identical to that provided in the abstract condition.
Whereas the ‘‘abstract’’ passage focused participants’
attention on why they might participate in a psychology
experiment (to ﬁnd happiness in life), however, the
‘‘concrete’’ passage focused participants’ attention on
how they might ﬁnd happiness in life (by participating in
a psychology experiment):
For everything we do, there always is a process of how we do it.
Moreover, we often can follow our broad life-goals down to our
very speciﬁc behaviors. For example, like most people, you
probably hope to ﬁnd happiness in life. How can you do this?
Perhaps ﬁnding a good job, or being educated, can help. How
can you do these things? Perhaps by earning a college degree.
How do you earn a college degree? By satisfying course require-
ments. How do you satisfy course requirements? In some cases,
such as today, you participate in a psychology experiment. Re-
search suggests that engaging in thought exercise like that
above, in which one thinks about how one’s ultimate life goals
can be expressed through speciﬁc actions, can improve people’s
life satisfaction. In this experiment, we are testing such a tech-
nique. This thought exercise is intended to focus your attention
on how you do the things you do. For this thought exercise,
please consider the following activity: ‘improving and maintain-
ing one’s physical health.’
After reading the passage, participants assigned to
the concrete condition listed three means by which they
could improve and maintain their health. In reference to
each means they listed, participants used a 5-point scale
(1¼a little; 5¼very, very much) to answer the question,
‘‘How much will engaging in this activity improve and
maintain your health?’’ Participants in the concrete
condition lastly completed a diagram (see Fig. 1, right
panel) showing how they could improve and maintain
their health.
Accordingly, participants assigned to both the con-
crete and the abstract conditions considered the same
activity, health improvement, although participants in
the concrete condition considered how they could im-
prove their health and participants in the abstract con-
dition considered why they would improve their health.
Others’ social intelligence
In an ostensibly unrelated task, all participants next
learned of a social-intelligence assessment program
(adapted from Freitas et al., 2001; Study 3) that we
purportedly were developing for use with high school
students:
Social intelligence refers to people’s ability to get along well
with others. People who are highly socially intelligent usually
know the right things to say and do in social, professional,
and educational settings. In contrast, people with low social in-
telligence tend to insult or oﬀend other people (often without
even knowing it), so they have a hard time cultivating truly
2 In a pilot study with 66 participants, we examined the impact of
this manipulation on linguistic indicators of abstract versus concrete
thinking. Based on the linguistic category model (Semin & Fiedler,
1988, 1992), we gauged the abstraction level of participants’ responses
according to the types of verbs and adjectives used to complete the
empty boxes in the mindset induction. Using Semin and Smith’s (1999;
cf. Semin & Fiedler, 1988) coding scheme, we assigned scores of 1, 2, 3,
and 4 to descriptive action verbs, interpretive action verbs, state verbs,
and adjectives, respectively. Two independent coders unaware of our
hypotheses made these ratings with a high degree of reliability (95%
agreement). The resulting score reﬂects degree of abstraction, with
higher scores indicating greater abstraction levels (i.e., greater
independence of contextual detail). These scores were then divided
by the total number of words generated during the mindset task,
providing each participant with a single score indicating average level
of abstraction across all generated words. As expected, participants
who received the abstract mindset induction used language reﬂecting a
higher abstraction level ðM ¼ :82Þ than did participants who received
the concrete mindset induction (M ¼ :41; tð64Þ¼5:90; p <: 0001,
Cohen’s d ¼ 1:47). This ﬁnding strongly suggests that the diﬀerent
mindset inductions successfully led participants to represent action
diﬀerentially abstractly.
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their full potential at work and at school. Our research group,
in collaboration with several others, is developing an assess-
ment of social intelligence among high school students. In de-
ciding how to provide feedback to these students, we are
seeking the advice of people of various age groups. In this ques-
tionnaire, we are interested in your opinion about providing so-
cial intelligence feedback to high school students.
The issue of providing positive versus negative feed-
back we described as follows:
Our assessment of social intelligence includes two components:
The ‘‘Weaknesses Component’’ is designed to point out areas
where high school students’ social intelligence is low and in
need of improvement. The results can help pinpoint their weak-
nesses and show how they could be damaging their lives. The
‘‘Strengths Component’’ is designed to point out areas where
high school students’ social intelligence is high so they can take
further advantage of it. The results can help pinpoint their
strengths and show how they could be beneﬁting their lives.
Participants used 9-point scales (1¼not at all;
9¼extremely) to answer two questions (collapsed below
for brevity) concerning their preferences for feedback
provision for others: ‘‘How worthwhile do you think it
is to provide high school students with social intelligence
feedback concerning their strengths [weaknesses]?’’ and
two questions (collapsed below for brevity) concerning
their inferences of others’ feedback preferences: ‘‘How
interested do you think high school students would be in
ﬁnding out about their strengths [weaknesses]?’’ The
order in which these four questions were presented was
randomized across participants.
Results
In this experiment, as well as in the others reported in
this paper, controlling for the number of words partici-
pants generated in the mindset tasks did not alter the
statistical signiﬁcance of any reported results. Partici-
pants’ anticipations of others’ feedback preferences were
analyzed in a 2 (mindset: how versus why) 2 (feedback
type: strengths versus weaknesses) ANOVA, with re-
peated measures on the last factor. Overall, participants
more strongly inferred that high school students would
desire feedback concerning their strengths ðM ¼ 7:82Þ
than their weaknesses ðM ¼ 5:58Þ; Fð1;109Þ¼124:60;
p <: 01. Most relevant to our hypotheses, as shown in
Fig. 2, participants’ mindsets signiﬁcantly moderated the
degree to which they anticipated that others would
prefer strengths- versus weaknesses-based feedback,
Fð1;109Þ¼4:04; p <: 05. Participants assigned to the
abstract mindset condition ðM ¼ 6:02Þ anticipated that
others would desire liabilities-based feedback to a
stronger degree than did participants assigned to the
concrete mindset condition ðM ¼ 5:06Þ; tð109Þ¼2:59;
p <: 02; d ¼ :49. The two groups did not diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly with respect to the degree to which they assumed
that others would desire strengths-based feedback, t < 1.
Regarding participants’ preferences for providing others
with diﬀerent types of feedback, overall, participants
more strongly endorsed providing high school students
with feedback concerning their strengths ðM ¼7:50Þ than
their weaknesses ðM ¼6:68Þ; Fð1;109Þ¼ 18:59; p <: 01.
Most relevant to our hypotheses, as shown in Fig. 3,
participants’ mindsets signiﬁcantly moderated the degree
to which they preferred providing strengths- versus
weaknesses-based feedback, Fð1;109Þ¼5:82; p <: 02.
Participants assigned to the concrete mindset condition
ðM ¼ 7:81Þ more strongly endorsed providing strengths-
based feedback than did participants assigned to the
abstract mindset condition ðM ¼ 7:17Þ; tð109Þ¼2:39;
p <: 02; d ¼ :46. The two groups did not diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly with respect to the degree to which they endorsed
providing weaknesses-based feedback, t < 1.
Discussion
Whereas negative feedback can be unpleasant to re-
ceive but provide longer-term beneﬁts by guiding eﬀorts
Fig. 2. Anticipated feedback seeking of others, as a function of type of
feedback (strengths-based versus liabilities-based) and participants’
mindsets (abstract versus concrete), Experiment 1.
Fig. 3. Suggested feedback seeking of others, as a function of type of
feedback (strengths-based versus liabilities-based) and participants’
mindsets (abstract versus concrete), Experiment 1.
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to receive but, because it cannot guide any action to-
ward improvement, oﬀers less in the way of long-term
beneﬁts. We examined whether one’s general mindset
could inﬂuence the salience of these abstract versus
concrete situational inducements, as they apply to one’s
anticipations and preferences of others’ self-regulatory
eﬀorts. Would a generally abstract (rather than con-
crete) mindset, by making salient the abstract value of
negative feedback rather than its immediate unpleas-
antness, inﬂuence the self-evaluative goals one antici-
pated and suggested that others adopt? Supporting this
prediction, participants induced to adopt an abstract
mindset, relative to those induced to adopt a concrete
mindset, through completing a thought exercise con-
cerning improving their physical health, were more
likely to both expect and suggest that others receive
feedback highlighting personal weaknesses needing im-
provement. These ﬁndings show that the accessibility of
the cognitive operations of considering an activity’s
process or purpose can color how people construe newly
encountered activities, including even those in which
they themselves are not required to act. A practical
implication is that considering how versus why to en-
gage in some action could inﬂuence markedly the goals
one anticipates, and endorses, that others to adopt in
quite diﬀerent domains. Merely considering how rather
than why to take a weekend trip, for example, might
convince a high school teacher that students desire
sugarcoated rather than honest feedback.
Experiment 2
Features of situations can directly activate goal rep-
resentations (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barn-
dollar, & Tr€ otschel, 2001; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003).
Accordingly, because any situation likely contains
multiple goal-relevant features, we view the problem of
understanding how people anticipate and guide others’
self-regulatory eﬀorts to depend critically on which
features of others’ situations people attend to. We sug-
gest that an abstract mindset leads one to attend pref-
erentially to the long-term, abstract rewards present in
another’s situation, thus activating goal representations
maximizing those long-term, abstract opportunities.
Although consistent with results of Experiment 1, this
explanation has not yet received direct scrutiny. An al-
ternative possibility, for example, is that people in ab-
stract and concrete mindsets diﬀer not in their attention
to others’ immediate versus long-term situational in-
ducements but, rather, in their weighting of them, when
deciding upon, or inferring, others’ courses of action.
Assuming either diﬀerent salience of goal-relevant fea-
tures of others’ situations or diﬀerent conclusions about
the appropriate decisional weighting of equally salient
situational features, these alternative possibilities impli-
cate diﬀerent underlying processes.
In Experiment 2, therefore, we more directly exam-
ined the inﬂuence of abstract and concrete mindsets on
the salience of goal-relevant features of others’ situa-
tions. Conceptualizing salient situational features as
those that stand out prominently from others, thus
capturing selective attention (e.g., Higgins, 1996), we
measured salience in two ways. First, we assessed the
speed with which participants could describe abstract
and concrete goal-relevant features of others’ situations.
Salient information facilitates faster responses (e.g.,
Bachorowski & Newman, 1990; Lamberts, 1998). Sec-
ond, we assessed the extent to which participants ex-
pected abstract and concrete goal-relevant features of
others’ situations to impact others. Salient information
facilitates stronger ascriptions of causal power (e.g.,
Sanbonmatsu, Shavitt, & Gibson, 1994; Taylor & Fiske,
1978). Following our reasoning, then, participants in
abstract mindsets, relative to those in concrete mindsets,
should: (a) be faster to list long-term, rather than im-
mediate, goal-relevant features of others’ situations and
(b) expect long-term, rather than immediate, goal-rele-
vant features of others’ situations to have greater im-
pacts on others.
Another aim of Experiment 2 was to examine an
additional aspect of self-evaluation. Experiment 1 con-
cerned inferences regarding others’ pursuit of positive
versus negative feedback. As suggested above, the latter
type of feedback can guide long-term self-improvement,
whereas the former type can provide a positive imme-
diate experience. However, both positive and negative
feedback can be either accurate or inaccurate. Rather
than as a tradeoﬀ between obtaining positive versus
negative feedback, then, the self-regulatory challenge
posed by self-evaluation can be characterized more ru-
dimentarily as a tradeoﬀ between obtaining highly ac-
curate information or information accurate only to the
extent that it does not damage one’s self-esteem. We
adopted this characterization in Experiment 2. Experi-
ment 2a examined preliminarily whether the mindset
eﬀect obtained in Experiment 1 would generalize to this
new context. Experiment 2b additionally assessed the
indicators of attentional salience discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph. To probe further this work’s gener-
ality, Experiment 2a concerned self-evaluation in the
domain of social intelligence, as did Experiment 1,
whereas Experiment 2b concerned self-evaluation in the
domain of career selection; moreover, in Experiment 2a,
as in Experiment 1, the mindset induction concerned
health improvement, whereas, in Experiment 2b, the
mindset task induction concerned academic achieve-
ment. Finally, to gauge the potential linearity of the
inﬂuence of abstract and concrete mindsets on inferring
others’ self-regulatory preferences, Experiment 2a in-
cluded a no-mindset-induction control condition.
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Participants
In exchange for credit toward various psychology
courses, 97 undergraduates participated in Experi-
ment 2a, and 103 undergraduates participated in
Experiment 2b.
Mindset inductions
Participants were assigned randomly to complete ei-
ther the abstract or the concrete versions of the mindset
manipulation described in Experiment 1. The target of
the thought exercise was either ‘‘health improvement,’’
(Experiment 2a) or ‘‘academic improvement’’ (Experi-
ment 2b). Experiment 2a additionally included a
no-mindset-induction control condition, in which par-
ticipants answered unrelated questionnaires lasting
approximately 5–10min.
Feedback descriptions
Participants in Experiment 2a next read about the
high school social-intelligence assessment described in
Experiment 1, whereas participants in Experiment 2b
read about a high school assessment providing career
feedback (adapted from Freitas et al., 2001; Experi-
ment 4): ‘‘Our research group, together with several
others, is developing a career assessment tool for high
school students. We interview and observe profession-
als from a range of ﬁelds (arts, sciences, and busi-
nesses) and devise proﬁles of the personal qualities
(abilities, likes, and dislikes) that lead to success and
failure within particular careers. We then assess high
school students on these same qualities and identify the
careers likely to lead to each particular student’s later
failure and success. In deciding how to provide feed-
back to these students, we are seeking the advice of
people of various age groups. Today we want your
opinion about providing career feedback to high school
students.’’
Preferences regarding others’ self-evaluative eﬀorts
The accuracy-versus-enhancement tradeoﬀ was in-
troduced to participants as follows: ‘‘Sometimes the
most accurate feedback will also make the student feel
quite upset, or disappointed with himself or herself. We
can address this issue by providing feedback that is ac-
curate only to the extent that it does not make them very
upset or disappointed.’’ To answer the question, ‘‘In
your own opinion, how should we approach this issue?’’
participants used an 8-point scale (in Experiment 2a) or
a 7-point scale (in Experiment 2b) to indicate their
degree of preference with the anchors ‘‘greatly limit
accuracy in order to preserve students’ self-esteem’’
versus ‘‘maximize accuracy even if it greatly damages
students’ self-esteem.’’
Salience of abstract and concrete goal-relevant features of
others’ situations
Via computer, participants of Experiment 2b were
prompted four times to ‘‘Please list a feeling or emotion
you think high school students might feel as they wait to
receivecareerfeedback.’’Afterprovidingeachofthefour
emotions,participantswereaskedtoanswerthequestion:
‘‘To what extent do you think that students waiting to
receive feedback will experience the emotion you just lis-
ted?’’ Participants also were prompted four times to
‘‘Pleaselistonelong-termgoalhighschoolstudentscould
reachbyreceivingcareerfeedback.’’Afterprovidingeach
of the four goals, participants were asked to answer the
question: ‘‘To what extent do you think that high school
students receiving feedback will meet the goal you just
listed?’’ The order in which participants listed goals and
emotions was randomized across participants.
Response times to list abstract and concrete goal-relevant
features. The computer recorded response times for each
goal and emotion participants listed as well as the
number of typed characters used for each response.
Because both variables generated positively skewed
distributions, both variables were subjected to natural
logarithmic transformation (see Fazio, 1990; Judd &
McClelland, 1989). Emotion facilitation and long-term
goal facilitation each were calculated separately as the
average number of characters listed in each of four
typed responses divided by the average response time to
list each of four typed responses (for goal facilitation,
a ¼ :66; for emotion facilitation, a ¼ :67). Creating a
single index of participants’ diﬀerential facilitation of
these two constructs, each participant’s emotion-facili-
tation score was subtracted from his or her goal-facili-
tation score. Thus, high scores on this index indicate
faster responses (more characters typed per second)
when listing others’ long-term goals than when listing
others’ emotional experiences during assessment.
Expected impact of abstract and concrete goal-relevant
features. Creating a single index of participants’ diﬀer-
ential impact ratings, each participant’s average rating
of the likelihood that feedback seekers would experience
the four emotions ða ¼ :63Þ was subtracted from his or
her average rating of the likelihood that feedback
seekers would realize the four goals ða ¼ :63Þ. Thus,
high scores on this index indicate greater perceived
likelihood that others’ would realize the long-term goals
participants listed than experience the emotions partic-
ipants listed.
Results
Preferences regarding others’ self-evaluative eﬀorts
Concerning the social intelligence feedback described
in Experiment 2a, participants’ assignment to the dif-
746 A.L. Freitas et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40 (2004) 739–752ferent mindset conditions signiﬁcantly aﬀected the de-
gree to which they preferred providing enhancing versus
accurate feedback to others, Fð2;97Þ¼4:48; p <: 02.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, this ﬁnding reﬂected a relatively
linear eﬀect of assignment to the three diﬀerent mindset
conditions, as revealed by a planned linear contrast,
Fð1;97Þ¼8:95; p <: 005. Participants assigned to the
abstract mindset condition ðM ¼ 5:24Þ endorsed pro-
viding accurate rather than enhancing feedback to a
greater extent than did participants assigned to the
concrete mindset condition ðM ¼ 4:12Þ; tð64Þ¼2:99;
p <: 01; d ¼ :72. Participants assigned to the no-mind-
set control condition scored in the middle ðM ¼ 4:74Þ,
although neither signiﬁcantly above those in concrete
mindset condition ðtð64Þ¼1:53; ns; d ¼ :40Þ nor sig-
niﬁcantly below those in the abstract mindset condition
(tð64Þ¼1:45, ns, d ¼ :34).
Concerning career feedback described in Experi-
ment 2b, participants assigned to the abstract mindset
condition also endorsed providing accurate rather
than enhancing feedback to a greater extent
ðM ¼ 4:15Þ than did participants assigned to the
concrete mindset condition ðM ¼ 3:47Þ; tð106Þ¼2:14;
p <: 05; d ¼ :41.
Salience of abstract and concrete goal-relevant features of
others’ situations
Participants assigned to the abstract mindset condi-
tion demonstrated greater facilitation of others’ long-
term goals versus immediate emotions ðM ¼ :067Þ than
did participants assigned to the concrete mindset con-
dition ðM ¼ :051Þ; tð105Þ¼2:20; p <: 03; d ¼ :43.
3
Moreover, participants assigned to the abstract mindset
condition rated others’ situations as more likely to im-
pact long-term goals versus immediate emotional reac-
tions ðM ¼ :359Þ to a greater extent than did
participants assigned to the concrete mindset condition
ðM ¼ :114Þ; tð106Þ¼1:93; p <: 06; d ¼ :37.
4 Suggest-
ing that these two eﬀects indeed reﬂect distinct aspects
of the salience of goal-relevant features of others’ situ-
ations, the eﬀect of the mindset manipulation on par-
ticipants’ facilitation scores was signiﬁcant when
controlling for their expected-impact scores, b ¼ :22;
Fð1;104Þ¼4:95; p <: 05, and the eﬀect of the mindset
manipulation on participants’ expected-impact scores
was signiﬁcant when controlling for their facilitation
scores, b ¼ :21; Fð1;104Þ¼4:38; p <: 05.
Moreover, participants’ preferences for others’ re-
ceipt of accurate versus enhancing feedback correlated
positively with both their facilitation scores ðr ¼ :22;
p <: 05Þ and their expected-impact scores ðr ¼ :25;
p <: 01Þ. As shown in Fig. 5, and consistent with the
possibility that these two aspects of the salience of goal-
relevant features of others’ situations help explain how
the mindset manipulation inﬂuenced participants’ pref-
erences for others’ receipt of the diﬀerent types of
feedback (see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998), in a si-
multaneous regression of participants’ preferences for
others’ receipt of the diﬀerent types of feedback on
participants’ mindset-induction assignment, facilitation
scores, and expected-impact scores, the mindset induc-
tion was no longer a signiﬁcant predictor ðb ¼
:11; Fð1;104Þ¼1:36; p >: 25Þ, whereas participants’
facilitation and expected-impact scores each accounted
for unique variance (b ¼ :20; Fð1;104Þ¼4:42; p <: 05;
and b ¼ :23; Fð1;104Þ¼6:09; p <: 05, respectively).
Content coding of emotions and goals
To explore the contents’ of participants’ free re-
sponses, two independent raters unaware of partici-
pants’ assignment to the diﬀerent mindset conditions
coded the contents of the long-term goals and immedi-
ate emotions participants listed. With an acceptable le-
vel of inter-rater agreement (average j ¼ :82), the raters
classiﬁed the long-term goals into seven diﬀerent cate-
gories (listed here in descending order from most com-
monly to least commonly listed: career development,
academic development, self-knowledge, personal devel-
opment, life happiness, ﬁnancial gain, and interpersonal
Fig. 4. Suggested accuracy (rather than self-enhancement) goals of
others, as a function of assignment to concrete versus abstract mindset
inductions or to a no-mindset control condition, Experiment 2a.
3 An alternative but mathematically equivalent data-analytic
approach to this question entails examining the goal and emotion
facilitation measures separately in a 2 (Mindset: Abstract vs.
Concrete) 2 (Facilitation Content: Goal versus Emotion) ANOVA,
with repeated measures on the last factor. This analysis yields a two-
way interaction identical in statistical signiﬁcance to the t test of the
diﬀerence score reported above, Fð1;105Þ¼4:88; p <: 03. We report
the diﬀerence score in the text because it reﬂects our conceptual interest
in relative focus on purpose- versus process-related phenomena, while
providing a single composite variable that can be used in later
correlation and regression analyses.
4 Consistent with reasoning described in Footnote 3, a 2 (Mindset:
Abstract vs. Concrete) 2 (Expected-Impact Content: Goal versus
Emotion) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, yields a
two-way interaction identical in statistical signiﬁcance to the t test of
the diﬀerence score reported above, Fð1;106Þ¼3:71; p <: 06.
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sponses could not be placed into a goal category. Career
development ðM ¼ 1:12Þ and academic development
ðM ¼ :94Þ were the most commonly listed goals, and
interpersonal relationship development was the least
commonly listed goal ðM ¼ 0:12Þ. While applying a
Bonferroni correction controlling for the multiple
comparisons of abstract versus concrete mindset par-
ticipants’ listings of the seven types of goals, one sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect emerged: participants assigned to the
abstract condition listed a greater number of self-
knowledge goals ðM ¼ 0:91Þ than did participants
assigned to the concrete condition ðM ¼ 0:38Þ; tð104Þ¼
2:94; p <: 05; d ¼ :58. Thus, approximately twice as
many participants assigned to the abstract condition
listed at least one self-knowledge goal (27 out of 53) as
did participants assigned to the concrete condition (13
out of 53), v2ð1; N ¼ 106Þ¼7:87; p <: 01. Self-knowl-
edge goals included goals such as ‘‘ﬁnd out about
themselves,’’ ‘‘ﬁnd out what they are good at,’’ and
‘‘ﬁnd out their strengths and weaknesses.’’ Even when
speciﬁcally directed to consider other’s long-term goals,
then, those with a high-level construal of the feedback
situation were more likely than those with a low-level
construal to view the situation as a vehicle by which
others could attain self-knowledge.
With an acceptable level of inter-rater agreement
(average j ¼ :80), the raters classiﬁed the emotions into
four categories reﬂecting either positive or negative va-
lence and either high or low arousal (see Feldman Bar-
rett & Russell, 1998); 1.8% of participants’ responses
could not be placed into an emotion category. Partici-
pants’ assignment to the diﬀerent mindset conditions did
not inﬂuence the particular types of emotions they listed
(all ts < 1). Overall, participants listed more negatively
valenced emotions ðM ¼ 2:55Þ than positively valenced
emotions ðM ¼ 1:34Þ and more high-arousal emotions
ðM ¼ 3:29Þ than low-arousal emotions ðM ¼ 0:60Þ. Ac-
cordingly, high-arousal/negative-valence emotions (e.g.,
anxious and nervous) were most commonly listed
ðM ¼ 2:00Þ, and low-arousal/positive-valence emotions
(e.g., relieved and calm) were least commonly listed
ðM ¼ 0:05Þ.
Discussion
Findings from Experiment 2 show that mindsets in-
ﬂuence in two ways the salience of outcomes others’
situations appear to oﬀer. First, participants in an ab-
stract mindset, relative to those in a concrete mindset,
were quicker to list the long-term goals than the im-
mediate emotional reactions others’ feedback situations
could bring about. Such diﬀerential facilitation of long-
term goals versus immediate emotional reactions should
inﬂuence the goals people expect and endorse that oth-
ers adopt (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Kruglanski, 1996). Con-
ﬁrming this expectation, greater facilitation of goals
than of emotions was associated with preferring that
others receive accurate rather than enhancing feedback.
Second, participants in an abstract mindset, relative to
those in a concrete mindset, expected that others’ feed-
back situations were more likely to impact their long-
term goals than their immediate emotional reactions.
Because people’s expectations of outcome likelihood
inﬂuence their decisions to pursue particular courses of
action (e.g., Bandura, 1989; Feather, 1989), such
diﬀerent expectancies should inﬂuence the goals people
expect and endorse that others adopt. Conﬁrming this
Fig. 5. Path analysis illustrating that participants’ facilitation and perceived impact of others’ long-term goals versus immediate emotional reactions
helps explain their preferences for others’ self-evaluative goals, Experiment 2b. Note.  p <: 04; zp >: 25.
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tion would impact others’ long-term goals than imme-
diate emotional reactions was associated with preferring
that others receive accurate rather than enhancing
feedback. Moreover, regression analyses suggested that
these two variables—diﬀerential facilitation and diﬀer-
ential expected impact of goal-relevant features of oth-
ers’ situations—helped explain the eﬀect of the mindset
manipulation on participants’ degree of preferring oth-
ers receive accurate versus enhancing feedback.
These ﬁndings also help address the possibility that
our mindset manipulations inﬂuenced participants’
preferred goals of others by inﬂuencing their level of
engagement in others’ situations. It is conceivable, for
example, that, relative to concrete construals, abstract
construals of others’ situations could be either less en-
gaging, due to a lack of focus on tangible details, or
more engaging, by highlighting important, abstract
aims.
5 Diﬀerences in engagement, in turn, might inﬂu-
ence one’s level of concern or commitment that others
receive the most useful feedback, thus perhaps inﬂu-
encing one’s preferences for the type of feedback others
receive. Suggesting that the current results do not de-
pend on such diﬀerences in engagement, however, ﬁnd-
ings from Experiment 2b demonstrated that some
features of others’ situations (e.g., others’ immediate
comfort) were most salient to participants in a concrete
mindset, whereas others features (e.g., others’ long-term
aims) were most salient to participants in a concrete
mindset. Rather than suggesting a main eﬀect whereby
people in abstract or concrete mindsets show greater
overall engagement in others’ situations, then, the data
seem to show that people in a concrete mindset appear
especially engaged by process-related features of others’
situations, whereas people in an abstract mindset appear
especially engaged by purpose-related features of others’
situations.
General discussion
Understanding and inﬂuencing others’ goals and in-
tentions are central to navigating everyday life, evident
even among very young children and infants (e.g., Ku-
hlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003; Meltzoﬀ, 1995; Mont-
gomery, Moran, & Bach, 1996). Seeking to understand
mechanisms underlying these processes, we examined the
role that abstract and concrete mindsets play in directing
attention to particular goal-relevant aspects of others’
situations. We assume that people will both anticipate
and suggest that others pursue courses of action maxi-
mizing beneﬁts and minimizing costs associated with
those goal-relevant features of others’ situations that are
most salient. Accordingly, we expected that participants
in a generally abstract mindset, for whom the cognitive
operation of considering activities’ abstract aims is
highly accessible, would be most likely to consider how
others’ self-evaluative situations could impact others’
long-term aims of self-knowledge and self-improvement,
thus leading these participants to both expect and sug-
gest that others pursue accurate, even self-critical, feed-
back. In contrast, we expected that participants in a
generally concrete mindset, for whom the cognitive op-
eration of considering the concrete procedures compris-
ing activities is highly accessible, would be most likely to
consider how others’ self-evaluative situations could
impact others’ immediate comfort during the feedback-
acquisition process, thus leading these participants to
both anticipate and suggest that others pursue pleasant-
to-receive, positive feedback.
Data from two experiments supported these hypoth-
eses, whether participants’ mindsets grew from thinking
diﬀerentially abstractly about identical content matter
concerning health improvement (Experiments 1 and 2a)
or academic improvement (Experiment 2b); whether
others’ feedback was framed as strengths-based versus
liabilities-based (Experiment 1) or as accurate versus
self-enhancing (Experiments 2a and b); and whether
others’ self-evaluative domains concerned social intelli-
gence (Experiments 1 and 2a) or career aptitude (Ex-
periment 2b). Participants in abstract mindsets both
anticipated (Experiment 1) and suggested (Experiments
2a and b) that others pursue realistic rather than overly
positive self-relevant information, and this eﬀect appears
to have been explained by the salience of abstract versus
concrete goal-relevant features of others’ situations
(Experiment 2b).
Implications for mindset research
These ﬁndings illustrate a distinction between what
we have termed abstract and concrete mindsets and
what has served as an inspiration for this project, work
on deliberative and implemental mindsets (e.g., Armor
& Taylor, 2003; Brandstaetter & Frank, 2002; Gollwit-
zer, 1990; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999, 1990; Gollwitzer,
Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Harmon-Jones & Har-
mon-Jones, 2002). As reviewed earlier in this article,
deliberative mindsets grow from weighing the pros and
cons of not-yet-decided-upon courses of action, whereas
implemental mindsets grow from planning the imple-
mentation of decided-upon courses of action. Our con-
ceptual debt to this work, then, is clear, in that we also
assume that focusing on the purpose (i.e., pros versus
cons) or process (i.e., implementation) of an activity are
cognitive operations that can become accessible and
carry over from one task to another. However, our lack
of any decisional diﬀerences between mindset manipu-
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for these interesting sugges-
tions.
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tions that diﬀer substantially from implemental/delib-
erative mindset predictions. Because implemental
mindsets are assumed to generate broad determination
to follow through on decided-upon courses of action,
such mindsets have been theorized to promote positively
biased views of situational aﬀordances as overly sup-
portive of one’s current aims (Gollwitzer & Kinney,
1989; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). In Experiment 2b,
however, participants in concrete mindsets, generated
through planning how to carry out an activity desig-
nated by the experimenter, viewed aﬀordances of others’
situations less favorably (i.e., as more likely to cause
negative aﬀective experiences than to cause the attain-
ment of long-term aims) than did participants in ab-
stract mindsets, generated through considering the
abstract value of the same experimenter-designated ac-
tivity. When not also inﬂuencing one’s decisional status,
therefore, a concrete, process-centered (versus abstract,
purpose-centered) mindset does not appear to generate
the level of commitment and determination required to
foster positively biased assessments of situational aﬀor-
dances as overly supportive of one’s aims. Instead, it
appears that a concrete mindset serves to increase the
salience of features of an activity that impact either
positively or negatively the carrying out of the activity’s
underlying procedures.
More generally, we hope that this work contributes to
eﬀorts to understand the basic nature of mindsets. We
view mindsets as a heightened accessibility of cognitive
operations (Gollwitzer, 1990), whereby recently used
cognitive operations are assumed to have temporarily
higher activation levels, thus increasing their likelihood
of being used to interpret new information (cf. Higgins,
1996). Our aim of dissociating abstract and concrete
mindsets from participants’ decisional statuses reﬂects
an attempt to examine only such increased-accessibility
inﬂuences. Continuing in this vein, for the sake of par-
simony and clarity, we advocate maintaining conceptual
distinctions between mindsets and related constructs (cf.
Gibson, 1941). It might be tempting, for example, to
view goals as essentially synonymous with mindsets
(Stapel & Koomen, 2001), especially if mindset manip-
ulations generate eﬀects apparently similar to those
generated by implicit goal manipulations (Stapel &
Koomen, 2001). Common outcomes, however, do not
necessarily signify a common cause. Whereas the ac-
cessibility of mindsets, like other momentarily activated
cognitive material, can be expected to dissipate gradu-
ally across time (e.g., Higgins, 1996), goals, through
marshalling motivation, are expected to remain acces-
sible only until they are satisﬁed (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001;
Zeigarnik, 1938). Implicitly primed aﬃliation goals, for
example, continued to impact the behavior of only those
participants who had not yet had an opportunity to
attempt aﬃliative actions (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). In
contrast, the mindset concept excludes by deﬁnition
such ‘‘satiation’’ eﬀects; otherwise, it would be impos-
sible for the accessibility of a cognitive operation to
carry over from a completed task to a new task. Future
work, then, will beneﬁt from maintaining distinctions
between the mindset and goal concepts. In this spirit,
such work might explore in more detail the time course
of mindset accessibility eﬀects, as well as how the cog-
nitive procedures that give rise to mindsets are repre-
sented mentally in a manner that is apparently
suﬃciently coherent as to allow uniﬁed activation.
Interpersonal implications
These considerations suggest further interpersonal
implications. Research on the self-fulﬁlling prophecy,
for example, shows that people’s interpersonal expec-
tations inﬂuence how they treat others, which can lead
others to behave in expectancy-conﬁrming ways (e.g.,
Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998; Merton,
1948). Accordingly, by aﬀecting which goals one infers
that others will pursue in a situation, one’s mindset
might lead one to treat others such that they actually
come to adopt goals that existed initially only in one’s
mindset-driven inferences. A related possibility is that
one’s mindset might aﬀect how positively one judges
others’ behaviors. If an abstract mindset leads one to
focus on the long-term beneﬁts of negative feedback,
for example, will a person in an abstract mindset judge
a person seeking overly positive feedback to be an
undisciplined hedonist? In contrast, if a concrete
mindset leads one to focus on the comfort and ease of
the self-evaluative processes, will a person in a concrete
mindset judge a person seeking accurate, negative
feedback to be a foolhardy glutton for punishment?
Finally, the inﬂuence of abstract and concrete mindsets
on people’s anticipations of others’ aims within a par-
ticular situation might diﬀer markedly from their in-
ferences of others’ dispositional inferences. By making
salient the abstract goal-relevant features of others’
situations, for example, an abstract mindset appears to
lead one to expect others to pursue the salient abstract,
long-term aim. Upon actually observing another person
striving toward an abstract aim, however, the salience
of those situational features relevant to the long-term
aim would support the inference that the person’s be-
havior is driven by situational inducements rather than
by an underlying disposition (e.g., Trope, 1986; Trope
& Gaunt, 1999). Accordingly, when it is clear that
another’s behavior reﬂects attempts at achieving a long-
term aim, an observer in a concrete mindset, for whom
the situational inducements relevant to the long-term
aim are presumably less salient, should be more likely
to infer an underlying disposition on the part of the
actor. We look forward to future pursuit of these
possibilities.
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